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THE RIGHT-OF-PUBLICITY CHALLENGES
FOR TATTOO COPYRIGHTS
Yolanda M. King*
This Article is the third and final piece of a series of articles that examine the
applicability of intellectual property law to tattoos. The second article in the series, The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, concluded that copyright owners can and should enforce their rights against users outside of the tattoo artist-customer relationship. This Article explores a different source of
intellectual property protection for tattoos: the right of publicity. As tattooing has
become increasingly prevalent among celebrities, tattoos have become “one”
with the persona of the tattoo bearer. A tattoo that carries the meaning of a celebrity tattoo bearer serves as indicia of that celebrity’s identity. The Article proposes that when a tattoo becomes associated with the meaning of a celebrity’s
identity, rather than solely retaining the message of the tattoo itself, the tattoo
moves beyond mere protection under copyright law and acquires additional protections under the right-of-publicity laws. This transformation of intellectual
property rights is the subject of the Article.
Right-of-publicity laws exist in more than thirty of the states in the United
States, in common law, by statute, or both.1 Therefore, assuming a state recognizes the right of publicity, and even if a celebrity (1) owns the identity at issue (validity) and (2) shows unauthorized third-party use of the identity in a way that is
harmful to the commercial value of the identity (infringement),2 the claim may
conflict with First Amendment interests. This Article also considers the various
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J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (Thomson Reuters
2015).
2
See Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J. 2000) (“To allege a prima facie case for infringement of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must show both validity
and infringement.”).
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tests employed by courts to accommodate the conflicting interests of the First
Amendment and the right of publicity. The Article endorses the Predominant Use
test, which properly recognizes the prevalence of mixed commercial and expressive uses for tattoos.
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INTRODUCTION
I am a canvas of my experiences, my story is etched in lines and shading, and
you can read it on arms, my legs, my shoulders, and my stomach.
—Kat Von D, tattoo artist and television personality3
Michael Gerard “Mike” Tyson is known for boxing.4 He is one of the most
famous heavyweight boxing champions, but he has also transitioned from a career in sports to a career in entertainment. Tyson is also well-known for the tattoo on the left side of his face, which he received during his boxing career in
2003.5 The Maori-style tattoo has been described as “instantly recognizable”6

3

Quotes About Tattoos, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/tattoos
[https://perma.cc/8NHV-2GM8] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
4
See Ira Berkow, Sports of the Times; He Rules the Planet, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 1988),
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/28/sports/sports-of-the-times-he-rules-the-planet.html
[https://perma.cc/ZQ7S-GHPZ]; Mike Tyson, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm00055
12/ [https://perma.cc/PWK9-JJW7] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
5
See Ray Glier, With Luster Faded, Tyson Places Career on the Line Tonight, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/22/sports/boxing-with-luster-faded-tysonplaces-career-on-the-line-tonight.html [https://perma.cc/7ZV5-KR2S]; David Whitley, Tyson
Tattoos Himself Instead of Opponents, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 19, 2003),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2003-02-19/sports/0302190202_1_tyson-tattooincredible-ink [https://perma.cc/6P3F-CKR5].
6
Noam Cohen, On Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, a Legal Issue., N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/media/21tattoo.html.
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and “one of the most distinctive tattoos in the nation.”7 As a result of Tyson’s
transition from an athlete to an entertainer, the tattoo has not only appeared in
boxing matches but also has been featured in films,8 television programs,9 and
other media.10
Due in part to its notoriety and popularity, Tyson’s facial tattoo was the
subject of the lawsuit Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.11 S. Victor
Whitmill, a tattoo artist, claimed that Warner Bros. infringed his copyright in
his creation, the “original and distinctive tattoo” applied to Tyson’s face, based
upon the production company’s unauthorized12 copying of the tattoo onto the
face of the actor Ed Helms13 in its motion picture The Hangover Part II,14 as
well as the reproduction, distribution, and display of the tattoo in connection
with the advertising and promotion of the movie.15 Warner Brothers argued that

7

Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t,
Inc., No. 4:11-cv-752, 2011 WL 2038147 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011), dismissed, No. 4:11CV-752 CDP (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011) [hereinafter Whitmill Complaint].
8
Mike Tyson Biography, BIO., http://www.biography.com/people/mike-tyson-9512980
[https://perma.cc/A3FY-DLD6] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
9
Id.; Mike Tyson, supra note 4.
10
Jon Swartz, Mike Tyson Promises Knockout with New Interactive Boxing App, USA
TODAY: TECHNOLOGYLIVE (Mar. 14, 2011, 5:31 PM), http://content.usato
day.com/communities/technologylive/post/2011/03/mike-tyson-promises-knockout-withnew-interactive-boxing-app-1/1 [https://perma.cc/GJ8E-7HML]. See generally Yolanda M.
King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129
(2013) [hereinafter Protection]. This Article was the first of a series of articles to examine
the applicability of copyright law to tattoos; it addressed the copyrightability of tattoos and
concluded that tattoos are subject to copyright protection. Id. The second piece of a series of
articles to examine the applicability of copyright law to tattoos analyzed the ownership and
enforcement of tattoo copyrights. See generally Yolanda M. King, The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 29 (2014) [hereinafter Enforcement].
11
Whitmill Complaint, supra note 7.
12
Id. at 1–2. The court concluded that the facts were largely uncontested and that “[n]either
Tyson nor Warner Brothers sought approval from Whitmill [to reproduce the tattoo] before
either movie.” Transcript of May 24 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2,
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 2011 WL 118119138 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2011) (No. 4:11CV-752-CDP) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript]. Further, the court determined that Whitmill
had not granted Warner Bros. a license, implied or otherwise, to “use the tattoo.” Id. at 4.
13
See Verified Answer to Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 6, Whitmill
v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-CV-752-CDP, (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter
Warner Bros. Answer] (“Warner Bros. states that Mr. Tyson appeared, with Mr. Tyson’s tattoo, in the first HANGOVER movie, as well as in an advertising poster for the first HANGOVER
movie, and that thousands of images of Mr. Tyson, with Mr. Tyson’s tattoo, have appeared
in magazines, on television and on the internet since February 10, 2003.”). Warner Bros.
admitted that Tyson’s tattoo and the tattoo appearing on actor Ed Helms’ face in The Hangover Part II are similar but denied that there was any copyrightable expression in Tyson’s tattoo or that the tattoo on Helm’s face was pirated. Id.
14
See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 7.
15
Id.
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the use of the tattoo was a parody of the tattoo.16 However, as I noted in my second article concerning the applicability of copyright law to tattoos, The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, such use was not commentary on
the tattoo itself but commentary on Mike Tyson.17 The effectiveness of the parody hinged upon the audience’s recognition of the meaning of Tyson’s tattoo as
a part of Tyson’s personality—aggression, masculinity, and strength—and the
juxtaposition of that meaning with the tattoo on the face of Ed Helms’s character in The Hangover Part II. Warner Brothers chose to use the tattoo because
the tattoo now conveyed qualities associated with Mike Tyson’s likeness. This
Article asserts that Mike Tyson’s tattoo has now taken on the meaning of Mike
Tyson’s identity, and therefore, the tattoo has become a part of his persona.
Thus, the copyrighted work of S. Victor Whitmill has been transformed into a
protectable part of Mike Tyson’s identity.
Further, this Article analyzes the potential enforcement of the rights, under
state right-of-publicity laws (defined hereinafter), that would protect a tattoo
associated with the identity of a celebrity. For example, what if an online vendor sold T-shirts, hats, and watches with a reproduction of the tattoo displayed
on those products? What if a fragrance company decided to sell a perfume with
the tattoo featured prominently on the bottle? Or, what if a film producer released a film featuring a male superhero that displayed Mike Tyson’s tattoo on
the front of his costume and sold promotional products featuring that same tattoo? These hypothetical scenarios are a few ways in which third parties might
use a celebrity’s tattoo in order to promote, advertise, and ultimately sell a
product. Furthermore, this Article asserts that these instances of tattoo use,
whether the use of an image of Tyson’s face, which displays the tattoo, or the
use of the facial tattoo alone, would infringe Tyson’s right of publicity.
Generally, the author of a work is the owner of the copyright in that work.18
Therefore, if a tattoo bearer is an author, or coauthor, of a tattoo, then the tattoo
bearer owns, or co-owns, the copyright in the tattoo.19 However, copyright
ownership by tattoo bearers is less common than copyright ownership by tattoo
artists because courts require the contribution of copyrightable subject matter

16

See Hearing Transcript, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that “[the reproduction] did not comment on the artist’s work or have any critical bearing on the original composition.”).
17
See Enforcement, supra note 10, at 60 n.180. While one might opine that Warner Brothers’ use of Tyson’s facial tattoo commented on the absurdity of tattooing an image on one’s
face, such use still did not comment on or parody the tattoo itself.
18
17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in
the work.”). An exception to the general rule is the work made for hire doctrine. Under the
work made for hire doctrine, the author of the work is “the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared.” Id.
19
Id.

16 NEV. L.J. 441, KING - FINAL.DOCX

Spring 2016]

4/1/16 11:59 AM

TATTOO PUBLICITY

445

by the copyright owner or co-owner.20 In The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, I encourage owners of copyrights in tattoos (who most often
will be the tattoo artists who create and ink the tattoos on the celebrities’ bodies) to vigilantly enforce their rights against parties outside of the tattoo artistclient relationship.21 However, in many instances, copyright owners, especially
tattoo artists, may not assert their rights in their works.22 While tattoo artists/copyright owners may have copyright infringement claims against such
third parties, there are other persons who may have other claims against third
parties, notably right-of-publicity claims by someone like Mike Tyson. Even in
the absence of a copyright-infringement claim, a celebrity should have a rightof-publicity claim, and the celebrity should be able to pursue a third party’s
violation of that right.23
The right of publicity “prevents the unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s name, likeness or other recognizable aspects of one’s persona.”24 The
individual has the exclusive right to license the use of his or her identity for
commercial purposes.25 More than half of the states in the United States recognize the right of publicity, in common law, by statute, or both.26 Generally,

20

See Enforcement, supra note 10, at 38 (citing Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d
1061, 1070–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (observing that the majority of courts have adopted the “copyrightability test,” which requires that each contribution to the work be copyrightable, in
evaluating whether one’s contributions to a copyrighted work amount to authorship)).
21
See id. at 33.
22
See Protection, supra note 10, at 138 (“The paucity of tattoo copyright cases and the absence of a judicial recognition of the protectability of tattoos may further contribute to tattoo
artists’ reluctance to seek remedies in the courtroom.”); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP
Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 532 (2013) (observing that “on the whole, [tattoo artists] were
reluctant to endorse reliance on the judicial system”).
23
Other scholars have contemplated whether right-of-publicity claims are preempted by
federal copyright law. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the
Right of Publicity with First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 165 (2010); David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The
Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 673–74 (1981). The
preemption issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
24
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“One who
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability.”); Copyright Guidance, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM,
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Services/Copyright-law.aspx
[https://perma.cc/58HZ-8FMQ] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
25
See Copyright Guidance, supra note 24; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 46. This Article will interchangeably use the terms “persona” and “identity” to refer to the
characteristics of an individual.
26
MCCARTHY, supra note 1. (“At the time of this writing, courts have expressly recognized
the right of publicity as existing under the common law of 21 states. Of those, eight also
have statutory provisions broad enough to encompass the right of publicity. In addition, ten
states have statutes which, while some are labeled ‘privacy’ statutes, are worded in such a
way that most aspects of the right of publicity are embodied in those statutes. Thus, at the
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state right-of-publicity laws allow a plaintiff to recover upon a showing that an
item of commerce associated with his or her identity has economic value.27
Right-of-publicity laws have been extended to cover references to a persona
such as voice, name, photograph, likeness, signature phrase, and fictional character.28 Other intellectual-property-law scholars have contemplated the possibility of a person’s identity to encompass images incorporated into a work of art
on a person’s body.29 Further, it has been recognized that the celebrity persona
carries a meaning that enables the sale of products and services associated with
that meaning.30 Thus, it is plausible that a celebrity could bring a right-ofpublicity claim based on appropriation of his or her identity, even if the exploited part of the identity is the celebrity’s tattoo.
This Article is the third and final piece of a series that examines the applicability of intellectual-property law to tattoos. It will analyze the intersection
of copyright and right-of-publicity laws in circumstances similar to the aforementioned hypothetical instances, and then it will weigh a celebrity’s right-ofpublicity interests against free-speech interests.
Part I of the Article begins with the conclusion reached in the first article in
this series regarding the applicability of copyright law to tattoos—namely, tattoos meet the requirements of copyrightability under federal copyright law, the
Copyright Act of 1976.31 It also examines how tattoos are unique subject matter
that moves from the protection of copyright law to the protection of right-ofpublicity laws.

time of this writing, under either statute or common law, the right of publicity is recognized
as the law of 31 states.”)
27
4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
& MONOPOLIES § 22.32 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed. 2015) (“According to much authority, in
order to recover for a violation of the right of publicity, a plaintiff must show that associating
an item of commerce with his or her identity has economic value.”); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The common law right of publicity, where it
has been recognized, grants celebrities an exclusive right to control the commercial value of
their names and to prevent others from exploiting them without permission.”).
28
ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 27.
29
Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property
Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 98, 137 (2003).
30
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of a Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 185 (1993). While Professor Madow recognizes the celebrity
persona carries a meaning that enables the sale of commodities associated with that meaning,
he concludes a celebrity is not solely responsible for cultivating that meaning, and therefore,
criticizes a celebrity’s exclusive ownership or control of the economic value in the persona.
Id. at 185–96.
31
See Protection, supra note 10, at 132 (concluding previously in The Challenges “Facing”
Copyright Protection for Tattoos that tattoos can meet the 1976 Act’s requirements of a copyrightable work—some tattoos are original, many, if not most, are fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and, the useful article doctrine does not preclude copyrightability of this
type of pictorial work).
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Part II first acknowledges the prevalence of tattooing among celebrities and
professional athletes32 and discusses the relevance of right-of-publicity laws in
light of the growing number of high-profile tattoo bearers. It then considers the
categorization of celebrities’ tattoos as indicia of their identity. Tattoos fall under the broad scope of one’s identity, and therefore, this Article posits they
should be protected by some states under right-of-publicity or right-of-privacy
laws.
In Part III, the Article examines the prevailing tests for balancing the right
of publicity against the First Amendment—the Rogers test, which was first employed in the context of the use of a celebrity’s name in the title of an expressive work in Rogers v. Grimaldi,33 the “Transformative Use” test for expressive
works under Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup,34 the “Relatedness” test of the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,35 and the “Predominant Use” test
adopted in Doe v. TCI Cablevision36 from a balancing approach proposed by
intellectual property practitioner Mark S. Lee,37 and supported by the proposed
“mixed or blended promotional/expressive uses” test articulated by Professor

32

This Article will refer to celebrities and professional athletes as “celebrities.” It acknowledges the ever-increasing possibility that non-professional athletes, such as collegiate athletes, may fall into this category too. Modern technology can transform anyone into a celebrity, but the “traditional” celebrity is the subject of this Article. See William K. Smith,
Saving Face: Adopting a Right of Publicity to Protect North Carolinians in an Increasingly
Digital World, 92 N.C. L. REV. 2065, 2066 (2014). A celebrity has been defined as a “famous
or well-known person” or “merely a person whom ‘many’ people talk about or know about.”
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:2.
33
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (1989) (employing a two-part test and concluding that the use of a celebrity’s name in the title of the film “Ginger and Fred” is “clearly
related to the content of the movie and is not a disguised advertisement for the sale of goods
or services or a collateral commercial product.”).
34
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–10 (Cal. 2001). (“In sum,
when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to his or her work, he or she may
raise as affirmative defense that the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as
it contains significant transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive
primarily from the celebrity’s fame.”)
35
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“[I]f
the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the
identified person, the user may be subject to liability for a use of the other’s identity in advertising.”).
36
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
37
Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 485, 500 (2003). (“If a product is being
sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other
circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an
expressive comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater
weight. Such an approach does justice to both the expressive and property interests.”)
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Lateef Mtima.38 This Part also analyzes the application of those tests to existing
and potential uses of tattoos and recommends the use of the Predominant Use
test (or mixed or blended uses test, which is a different articulation of the Predominate Use test) when balancing right-of-publicity and First Amendment interests in cases concerning the publicity rights of a celebrity tattoo bearer.
While advancing a right-of-publicity claim in connection with an expressive
use of a copyrighted work raises First Amendment concerns,39 courts should
avoid an “either/or characterization”40 of uses of “persona tattoos”41 in the determination of whether the use of the tattoo is expressive or commercial.42
I.   COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR TATTOOS
Copyright law is exclusively federal law,43 and tattoos appear to meet the
requirements of copyrightability, as they are “original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression” as required by Section 102(a) of the
Copyright Act of 1976.44 Some tattoos meet the requisite originality of federal
copyright law,45 and most tattoos are fixed, either in the traditional form of paper, such as sketches or drawings, on the unconventional (at least under copy-

38

Lateef Mtima, Protecting the Rights of Amateur Athletes: Transforming the Judicial Tests
for Balancing Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP.
154, 161 (2012) (asserting that “a socially balanced assessment of the competing interests”
requires that courts assess the social purposes at issue and balance the interests of the parties
in order to determine whether there should any remuneration to the plaintiff). This Article
agrees with Mtima’s position that the issue is one of allocation of rewards from exploitation
of an individual’s persona. This type of assessment is preferred to an “all or nothing” approach that places the right of publicity at odds with the First Amendment and results in “all
or nothing” recovery for the plaintiff (here, the tattoo bearer).
39
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1977) (recognizing individual’s right of publicity trumps media’s First Amendment concerns when television station
broadcasts entertainer’s act, without his consent, in its entirety).
40
Mtima, supra note 38, at 162 (“The technological advances of the past century have made
possible a wide variety of new commercial uses for individual personas and other IP rights,
and ‘either/or’ characterizations of such uses as publicity rights infringements or legitimate
First Amendment expressions are increasingly unhelpful.”).
41
For purposes of brevity, I will refer to a tattoo that has become “one” with the persona of
the tattoo bearer as a “persona tattoo.” Such tattoos are distinguishable from tattoos that continue to solely represent a meaning independent of the tattoo bearers.
42
Mtima, supra note 38, at 162.
43
17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are
governed exclusively by this title.”).
44
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
45
Perzanowski, supra note 22, at 525 (“A tattoo, like any other original work fixed in a tangible medium, is protected by copyright law.”).
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right law) medium of human skin, or both.46 Therefore, at least some tattoos are
protectable subject matter under federal copyright law. In addition, as concluded in The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, the fact that
a tattoo artist’s work is conveyed through the medium of the human body does
not preclude nor disqualify it from serving as a protectable medium of expression under copyright law.47 Thus, this choice of medium does not affect the
copyrightability of the work.48
However, when the medium is the body of a celebrity, and the tattoo becomes more associated with the celebrity tattoo bearer’s identity than the message, if any, of the work (whether it be aesthetic or political, for example), then
the copyrighted work moves from the copyright realm into subject matter of the
right of publicity. In such instances, the tattoo on a celebrity carries the meaning of the tattoo bearer, thereby serving as indicia of the celebrity’s identity.
For a celebrity to establish unauthorized use of his or her recognizable identity,
the use of the identity must be “sufficient to identify the person whose identity
the defendant is alleged to have appropriated,”49 and this requirement would be
met in instances of commercial use of a tattoo prominently displayed on the
body of a celebrity.50 Thus, the tattoo itself, born out of copyright law, would
now be subject to right-of-publicity laws. A celebrity could then file a lawsuit
alleging infringement of his or her right of publicity based on a third party’s
commercial use of the tattoo. Because the practice of tattooing among celebrities is commonplace,51 such lawsuits are likely in the future.

46

Id. at 526 (“Tattooers occasionally ink an image freehand directly on a client’s skin But
more often, they create a detailed line drawing of the tattoo design on paper.”) (footnotes
omitted).
47
See Protection, supra note 10, at 151–52.
48
Perzanowski, supra note 22, at 568 (“[T]attoo designs, whether fixed on paper or on human skin, are works embraced by copyright.”).
49
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995). The
Restatement elaborates that “in the case of an alleged visual likeness, the plaintiff must be
reasonably identifiable from the photograph or other depiction.” Id.
50
It is less likely that a tattoo fixed on a covered or private part of a celebrity’s body would
become an identifiable part of the celebrity’s persona because it would not be in public view.
However, this Article posits that, even if a tattoo does not meet the requisite level of originality for copyright protection (such as a basic geometric shape or unoriginal arrangement of
geometric shapes), it may become an identifiable part of a celebrity’s persona. Therefore, in
such likely limited instances, an uncopyrightable tattoo could still be protected by right-ofpublicity laws.
51
Ramin Setoodeh, Kat Von D: Are Celebrities Driving Tattoo Culture?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8,
2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/kat-von-d-are-celebrities-driving-tattoo-culture69897 [https://perma.cc/MFS3-SF3W] (discussing growth in popularity of tattoos among celebrities).
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II.   APPLICATION OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TO TATTOOS
The right of publicity is a state-law intellectual-property right.52 The right
is now recognized by more than thirty states in the United States.53 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines the right of publicity:
Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person’s Identity: The Right of
Publicity
One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using
without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.54

A succinct definition of the right of publicity is “the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”55 It has been
characterized as “our last, best hope of preventing others from profiting our
identities without our permission.”56
The right of publicity originates from the right of privacy,57 and it was first
recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.58 Judge
Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit coined the term “right of publicity” in an
effort to distinguish it from the right of privacy.59 He stated:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made “in gross,” i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else. . . .
This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is common knowledge
that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,

52

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3.
Id. at § 6:3.
54
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). Comment a
further delineates the right of publicity: “The appropriation of another’s identity for purposes
of trade can result in injury to both commercial and personal interests. This Restatement
deals with rules affording relief against unfair methods of competition, and the rules stated in
this Topic are therefore limited to the redress of commercial injuries. The interest protected
by these rules is often described as the ‘right of publicity.’ ” Id. cmt. a; see also ETW Corp.
v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 930 (6th Cir. 2003).
55
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3; see also MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3:2 (Thomas Reuters 2015) (describing the right of publicity as “an individual’s right to control commercial exploitation of his or her identity”).
56
LEE, supra note 55, § 3:1.
57
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:7.
58
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
59
Id.
53
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popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses,
trains and subways.60

Similar to the right of privacy, the right of publicity protects one’s “interest
in personal dignity and autonomy.”61 However, unlike the right of privacy,
which is concerned with harm to an individual’s personal interests,62 the right
of publicity protects against damage to the commercial value of an individual’s
identity.63 The rationale for the right of publicity is the protection of the economic value of a person’s identity, including the invested “time, effort, and expense” to cultivate such value.64 As a result of such protection, an individual is
incentivized to invest in the development of his or her identity, which ultimately benefits the public.65 The Supreme Court likened its rationale behind rightof-publicity protection to the underlying bases for patent and copyright laws.66
Other intellectual-property-law scholars have analyzed the additional rationale
for the right of publicity—the natural or property rights in one’s name and likeness.67
In order to establish a prima facie case of infringement of one’s right of
publicity, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership of the recognizable identity at
issue (validity) and (2) unauthorized third party use of the identity in a way that
is likely to cause damage to the commercial value of the celebrity’s identity (infringement).68 A plaintiff does not need to prove that the use caused damage to

60

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
62
See id. cmt. a (“Relief is also generally available under the law of torts for injuries to personal interests caused by the unauthorized commercial use of another’s identity. The protection of these personal interests is often described as an aspect of the ‘right of privacy.’ ”);
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:67 (“The critical difference is the nature of the right invaded:
either psyche or pocketbook. Once this distinction is accepted, the ‘personal’ or ‘property’
label follows easily, with the ‘right of privacy’ being a ‘personal right’ and the ‘right of publicity’ being a ‘property right.’ ”).
63
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (explaining that while “[t]he appropriation of another’s identity for purposes of trade can result
in injury to both commercial and personal interests,” the right of publicity rules are limited to
protection of commercial interests).
64
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977).
65
Id. at 576.
66
Id.
67
Daniel Gervais & Martin L. Holmes, Fame, Property, and Identity: The Purpose and
Scope of the Right of Publicity, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 194
(2015).
68
Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J. 2000) (“To allege a prima
facie case for infringement of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must show both validity and
infringement.”).
61
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his identity in order to establish a claim for liability and obtain injunctive relief;
damage is presumed from the unauthorized use.69
While the right of publicity is not solely the right of a celebrity,70 the majority of reported right-of-publicity decisions involve a celebrity.71 The identity
of a celebrity carries more significant commercial value than a private individual’s identity, and therefore, third parties are more likely to use a celebrity’s
identity in advertising, merchandise, and even in expressive or artistic works.72
The “associative value” of a celebrity’s identity positively impacts the sale of
goods and services, and such economic value is diminished by unauthorized
use.73 As a result, a celebrity must vigorously protect his right of publicity in
order to preserve the economic value of his identity. Hence, a right of publicity
lawsuit is often viewed as the “celebrity law suit.”74
A.   Prevalence of Tattooed Celebrities
The practice of tattooing has become commonplace in the entertainment
and sports industries.75 Tattooed celebrities have elevated the visibility and attractiveness of tattoos.76 Consequently, celebrities have played a significant role
in the growth of tattooing in popular culture.77 The mainstreaming of tattooing
has led to the commercialization of tattoos, transforming tattoo bearers and
69

Petty v. Chrysler Corp., 799 N.E.2d 432, 441–42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“A claimant alleging misappropriation of identity need not prove actual damages, because the court will presume damages if someone infringes another’s right to control his identity.”).
70
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3 (“The right of publicity is not merely a legal right of the
‘celebrity,’ but is a right inherent to everyone to control the commercial use of identity and
persona and recover in court damages and the commercial value of an unpermitted taking.”).
71
Id. § 4:2 (defining a celebrity as a “famous or well-known person” or “merely a person
whom ‘many’ people talk about or know about”).
72
Id. § 4:3.
73
Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 857 (1995); Lee, supra note
37, at 480 (“Allowing uncompensated third-party use also devalues the property and allows
unjust enrichment in violation of the owner’s property rights.” (citing Carson v. Here’s
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)).
74
Smith, supra note 32.
75
Wendy Haywood et al., Who Gets Tattoos? Demographic and Behavioral Correlates of Ever Being Tattooed in a Representative Sample of Men and Women, 22 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY
51, 51 (2012) (“Once the domain of gangs, prisoners, and specific subcultures, tattoos are
now regularly seen on celebrities, athletes, and middle-class young people.”); Mary Kosut,
An Ironic Fad: The Commodification and Consumption of Tattoos, 39 J. POPULAR CULTURE
1035, 1037–38 (2006) (observing prevalence of tattooed persons in the entertainment industry, including television personalities in soap operas, sitcoms, and reality television shows,
movie actors and actresses, musicians, and professional athletes); Setoodeh, supra note 51
(discussing growth in popularity of tattoos among celebrities).
76
See Kosut, supra note 75, at 1038 (“At the very least, the celebrity tattoo phenomenon
contributes to new understandings of tattoo and elevates tattoo’s cultural status.”).
77
Id.
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their accompanying tattoos into valuable products.78 Tattoos are used in advertising to sell products,79 and celebrities appear willing to be advertisements
themselves, bearing tattoos of products names and logos.80 For example, an advertising executive proposed the idea of professional basketball players wearing temporary tattoos to promote various products.81 Although the National
Basketball Association (“NBA”) officials rejected the proposal, NBA player
Stephon Marbury expressed that he would have considered it.82 Thus, celebrities, advertisers, and consumers alike recognize the economic value of celebrities and their tattoos.
B.   Tattoos as Indicia of Identity
At the inception of the right of publicity, the interpretation of identity was
limited to one’s name and likeness.83 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition includes the appropriation of “other indicia of identity” as an infringement of the right of publicity.84 It has been observed that certain people possess
other indicia of personality,85 and therefore, the right of publicity can be violated without the use of one’s name or likeness.86 A number of celebrities possess
other indicia of identity, and a tattoo prominently fixed on the body of one of
those celebrities could become an identifiable part of the celebrity’s identity.
Relevant evidence of identifiability “includes the nature and extent of the identifying characteristics used by the defendant, the defendant’s intent, the fame of
78

Id. at 1039; see also Enforcement, supra note 10, at 30 (noting that plaintiff tattoo artists
filed lawsuits due to primary concerns about reproduction of their works by third-party companies for the commercialization of products, i.e. a film, athletic shoe, and video game).
79
Kosut, supra note 75, at 1039 (“Whether designated as a sign of rebellion, youth, trendiness, or some amalgam of coolness, tattoos assist in selling products—from vodka to cars.
Thus, tattoo is used to sell a product and is simultaneously a product to be consumed.”).
80
Id.
81
Id; see also Stephen M. McKelvey, Commercial “Branding”: The Final Frontier or
False Start for Athletes’ Use of Temporary Tattoos as Body Billboards, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
SPORT 1, 3 (2002); John Vukelj, Post No Bills: Can the NBA Prohibit Its Players from Wearing Tattoo Advertisements?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 507, 509 (2005).
82
Kosut, supra note 75, at 1039; Vukelj, supra note 81, at 515.
83
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); LEE, supra
note 55; Halpern, supra note 73, at 859.
84
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
85
Id. cmt. d (“The use of other identifying characteristics or attributes may also infringe the
right of publicity, but only if they are so closely and uniquely associated with the identity of
a particular individual that their use enables the defendant to appropriate the commercial
value of the person’s identity.”); Halpern, supra note 74, at 860 (“But, of course, for certain
people, there may be other indicia of the unique persona; certain traits, characteristics, mannerisms, or even paraphernalia may be peculiarly attached to the individual so as uniquely to
evoke that individual.”).
86
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he case
law has borne out his insight that the right of publicity is not limited to the appropriation of
name or likeness.”).
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the plaintiff, evidence of actual identification made by third persons, and surveys or other evidence indicating the perceptions of the audience.”87 Courts
have expanded the scope of identity to encompass a wide variety of characteristics of a person,88 such as style,89 voice and sound-a-like,90 distinctive phrases,91
and more.92
Tattoos are powerful visual images, and some are already associated with
the identities of celebrities, such as Mike Tyson’s facial tattoo, Angelina Jolie’s
arm tattoo of the geographical coordinates of the birth places of her children
and husband Brad Pitt,93 and Rasheed Wallace’s arm tattoo of an Egyptianthemed depiction of his family.94 The unauthorized commercial use of tattoos
will continue to grow not only due to the aforementioned increasing prevalence
87

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 27 (observing that some jurisdictions have extended the
right of publicity to “include many types of references to a persona including voice, name,
photograph, likeness, business building, picture of a unique article, signature phrase, fictional character, etc.”) (citations omitted).
89
Id.
90
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that actress and
singer Bette Midler made a sufficient showing to defeat summary judgment that defendants’
use of a sound-a-like singer in an automobile commercial appropriated part of Midler’s identity—her voice); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992).
91
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
that defendant violated the right of publicity of former host of the television program “The
Tonight Show” John Carson because defendant used the phrase “Here’s Johnny,” the opening statement for Carson’s introduction on the weekday nightly television program, in connection with the sale of portable toilets).
92
Motschenbacher v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) (concluding that, even though the likeness of racing car driver Lothar Motschenbacher was not
visible in the cigarette commercial and defendant made changes to the race car featured in
the commercial, Motschenbacher had a protectable interest in his identity because the driver
in the commercial was identifiable as Motschenbacher in light of the distinctive decorations
on the car).
93
Angelina Jolie is known for her films, her humanitarian work, and her tattoos. VANISHING
TATTOO, http://www.vanishingtattoo.com/tattoo_facts.htm [https://perma.cc/ES2V-QTZ7]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (“Angelina’s number, choice, and types of tattoos rank the highest in the celebrity category [of tattoo searches].”). The tattoo on Angelina Jolie’s left arm
has been referred to as “one of the most infamous celebrity tattoos.” 30 Celebrity Tattoos:
Your Favorite Good, Bad & Ugly Ink, HUFFINGTON POST: HUFFPOST CELEBRITY (Jul. 16,
2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/28/celebrity-tattoos_n_3348545
.html [https://perma.cc/5BSF-DPJH] (displaying photographs of public’s favorite celebrity
tattoos).
94
Rasheed Wallace’s right arm tattoo was the subject of a lawsuit filed by tattoo artist Matthew Reed, who alleged that Nike and advertising agency Weiden + Kennedy directly infringed his copyright in the tattoo in the creation of a Nike advertising campaign on television and the internet. See Protection, supra note 10, at 142. “The advertisement included a
close-up of the tattoo and featured the tattoo being created by a computerized simulation
with a voice-over from Wallace describing and explaining the meaning of the tattoo.” Id. at
142–43. Arguably, the defendants in that lawsuit selected the tattoo, and Wallace’s explanation of it, as the centerpiece of the commercial, because it had become a part of his identity.
88
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of tattooing among the entertainment and sports industries but also due to the
ability of tattoos to conjure up the marketing power of their celebrity tattoo
bearers.
III.   FIRST AMENDMENT AND RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TESTS
There is a tension between the expressive rights embodied in the First
Amendment and the property rights embodied in right-of-publicity laws.95
Courts often “weigh the state’s interest in protecting a plaintiff’s property right
to the commercial value of his or her name and identity against the defendant’s
right to free speech.”96
Courts have used various tests for balancing publicity rights against First
Amendment interests when a plaintiff brings a right-of-publicity lawsuit, including the Transformative Use test, the Rogers test, and the Predominate Use
test.97 However, the majority of courts employ the Transformative Use test.98
This Article asserts that the Predominant Use test is the proper balancing approach for the evaluation of blended expressive and commercial uses of an
identity. The Predominant Use test will most effectively accommodate the conflicting publicity and free-speech interests in right-of-publicity cases, especially
in cases concerning a “persona tattoo.”

95

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (“There is an inherent
tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression under the First
Amendment.”); Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001)
(“The tension between the right of publicity and the First Amendment is highlighted by recalling the two distinct, commonly acknowledged purposes of the latter.”); Lee, supra note
37, at 479.
96
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003); ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931;
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Comedy III Prods.,
Inc., 21 P.3d at 806; Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 478 (Cal. 2003).
97
I am indebted to Professor David Rubenstein, a participant in the 2014 Washington University Law School’s Junior Faculty Regional Workshop, for the valuable suggestion that
perhaps the right of publicity/First Amendment balancing test might be viewed through a
constitutional conflict preemption lens. This perspective is intriguing because it presents a
novel means of scrutiny of the relationship between the right of publicity and First Amendment, but it is beyond the scope of this Article. However, an examination of the preemption
of right-of-publicity claims in general, and this suggestion in particular, may be fitting for
future analysis.
98
Gervais & Holmes, supra note 67, at 212 (“The transformative use test is widely used by
courts attempting to balance the right of publicity with the First Amendment.”); see also No
Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal Rptr. 3d 397, 400–01 (Ct. App. 2011). See generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th
Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing cases that also adopt
the Transformative Use test).
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A.   Transformative Use Test
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, defendants, artist Gary Saderup and Gary Saderup, Inc. (“Saderup”), sold lithographs and T-shirts bearing
the likenesses of the Three Stooges, a former comedy act of deceased personalities whose postmortem rights were owned by plaintiff Comedy III Productions.99 The image of the Three Stooges on the lithographs and T-shirts was
based upon a charcoal drawing previously created by Saderup.100 After the trial
and appellate courts found for Comedy III, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court.101 In doing so, the court articulated
the “Transformative Use test.”102
The California Supreme Court derived the “Transformative Use” test from
one of the fair use factors of federal copyright law.103 It described its test:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity without
adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist.
On the other hand, when a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is
also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of
publicity.104

The California Supreme Court elaborated that
[a]nother way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one
of the “raw materials” from which an original work is synthesized, or whether
the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the
work in question. We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s
own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.105

This lengthy explanation of the test, combined with additional characterizations of the test set forth in the decision, has been interpreted to include five
factors: (1) whether the literal or imitative depiction adds “significant expression,” (2) whether the celebrity image is one of the “raw materials from which
an original work is synthesized,” (3) whether the work is “primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity likeness,” (4) whether the
“literal and imitative elements” or the “creative elements” predominate the
work, and (5) whether the “marketability and economic value” of the work de99

Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 800–01.
Id.
101
Id. at 801, 811.
102
Id. at 808.
103
Id. at 807; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
104
Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808 (citation omitted).
105
Id. at 809.
100
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rives primarily from the celebrity’s fame.106 The test is used for cases in which
the plaintiff claims a defendant’s expressive work,107 which is protected by the
First Amendment, infringes the plaintiff’s right of publicity.
Under this test, courts analyze whether the defendant sufficiently transforms the plaintiff’s identity in the visual artistic work. However, this question
is an elusive one for courts to answer. Transformativeness is highly subjective—it is in the eye of the beholder.108 The Court of Appeals of California
found that the use of the likenesses of members of the rock band No Doubt in
the Band Hero video game was not transformative.109 In addition, the Third and
Ninth Circuits found non-transformative uses of the likenesses of former college football athletes Ryan Hart and Samuel Keller, respectively, in the NCAA
Football series video games.110 The courts reached these conclusions based on
the observations that the avatars in the video games were digital replicas of the
celebrities.111
In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished the case (as well as No Doubt and Hart) from the
California Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. DC Comics,112 which concerned the use of comic book characters Johnny and Edgar Autumn based on
famous rock star brothers Johnny and Edgar Winter.113 The In re NCAA court
also distinguished the facts of the Court of Appeals of California’s decision in
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,114 which concerned the use of the likeness of
singer Kierin Kirby, professionally known as “Lady Miss Kier,” as the basis for
news reporter character Ulala (whose name Kirby alleged sounded similar to
her “ ‘signature’ lyrical expression” “ooh la la”) in a video game.115 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the key distinction between these groups of cases was
that the celebrities’ likenesses in Winter and Kirby were transformed into crea106

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.72.
Expressive works range from traditional works of art, such as paintings and sculptures to
more modern artistic works, such as photography, comic books, cartoons, and video games.
See id.
108
See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 157, 187 (2015) (noting Judge Ambro’s dissent in Hart which agreed that the Transformative Use test was the proper test but disagreed that its interpretation and application
“adds credence to the objection that transformativeness requires judges to become art critics.”).
109
No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 410 (Ct. App. 2011).
110
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013).
111
Hart, 717 F.3d at 161–62; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1276; No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
409–10.
112
See generally Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
113
See generally In re NCAA, 724 F.3d 1268.
114
See generally Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (2006).
115
In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1276–77.
107
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tive, new characters in the expressive works at issue.116 The court further concluded that the NCAA Football video games at issue lacked transformative
context.117
Other intellectual property law scholars have criticized the No Doubt line
of cases, arguing that the courts have eviscerated First Amendment protection
for video games and that, unlike the California Court of Appeals’s application
of the Transformative Use test in No Doubt, the overall transformativeness of
the work should be considered.118 This Article asserts that the courts’ applications of the Transformative Use test are correct, but it is the wrong test for balancing First Amendment interests and right-of-publicity claims.
Even though the test is referred to as the “Transformative Use” test, the
Comedy III court’s expression of the test is unclear regarding whether the court
should consider either the depiction of the celebrity, the overall context of the
work, or both. It is clear, however, that the test is biased against a particular
medium of expression—video games—because the typical goal of a video
game creator is to depict the game content based on real people and their environments as literally as possible. If the additional “significant expression” is not
present in the depiction of the celebrity, which usually will not be the case, or
not present in the overall context of the game, which may not be the case, then
the right of publicity likely trumps the First Amendment under the Transforma116

Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1278 (“[T]he Third Circuit agreed with us that these changes [‘the potentially transformative nature of the game as a whole’ and ‘the user’s ability to alter avatar characteristics’] do not render the NCAA Football games sufficiently transformative to defeat a rightof-publicity claim.”).
118
See Tushnet, supra note 108, at 179–80.
117

Even though the avatars [in No Doubt] could be manipulated to perform at fanciful venues or to
sing songs the real band wouldn’t ever sing, and even though the game had many other creative
elements, the avatars were still “exact depictions” of the musicians doing what had made them
famous: performing music. The use of highly realistic digital depictions “was motivated by a desire to capitalize on the band’s fan-base,” so there was a violation of the right of publicity. This
result can be compared to a hypothetical biography that is exact in every description and detail,
the realism of which would plainly fail to justify liability.

Id. at 179. See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The Transformativenes Test
for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution
of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 32 (2003).
When transplanted to right of publicity cases involving a conflict between a persona claimant
and a visual artist, transformativeness does not effect that goal. Instead, it could limit the creation of new expressive works of visual art by prohibiting the reproduction and sale of copies of
artworks unless they are clearly transformative in the right of publicity sense. Saderup’s drawing
of the Three Stooges would clearly merit copyright protection—there was no evidence that his
drawing did not reflect original creation. Because it was a realistic depiction of the Stooges, selling reproductions was held to be unlawful. Hence, unlike in the case of using transformativeness
as a factor in a copyright fair use analysis, requiring transformativeness to protect visual art as
speech may protect celebrity economic interests, but it does not further originality in the creation
of new personae or in the creation of expressive works of authorship.

Id.
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tive Use test. Even if the additional “significant expression” is present in the
overall context of the game, but the court deems the overall context of the game
as irrelevant, then the court would likely reach the same outcome.
The Transformative Use test is an unpredictable balancing approach.119
Under the Transformative Use test, courts are more likely to reach disparate determinations in an analysis of the use of a celebrity’s tattoo in an expressive
work. The multi-step test requires, among other things, an analysis of whether
the artistic expression, or work, contains “transformative elements” or additional “significant expression” of the defendant.120 An assessment of these factors necessitates an aesthetic critique of the work and the depiction of the celebrity’s likeness in it. This assessment will be particularly challenging for courts
confronted with a persona tattoo use in light of (1) the likelihood that the use
will be both expressive and commercial, (2) the uniqueness of the indicia of
identity, and (3) the characterization of tattoos themselves as copyrightable
works of art.
B.   Rogers Test
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, highly acclaimed actress, dancer, and singer Ginger
Rogers, who performed with Hollywood star Fred Astaire, claimed the defendants violated her right of publicity and Lanham Act rights when they released a
film entitled “Ginger and Fred”—a fictional tale of two Italian cabaret performers who imitated the famous duo.121 The Second Circuit devised the Rogers test, which examines whether the use of one’s name in the title of an artistic
work is wholly unrelated to the underlying work.122 This test was used to balance First Amendment interests against a Section 43(a) Lanham Act claim123
and a right-of-publicity claim. The court applied the following two-part test for
balancing falsity claims against free speech:
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, that balance will normally not support application of the Act [1] unless the title has no
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, [2] if it has some artis-

119

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.72 (“The California Supreme Court expressed the ‘transformative’ test in terms that will unfortunately prove extremely difficult to predict and apply
because it requires a court to make an aesthetic judgment about the challenged artistic use.”).
120
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
121
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996–97 (2d Cir. 1989).
122
Id. at 1004.
123
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates civil liability for
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods,
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
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tic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of
the work.124

The court applied the two-part test and concluded Ginger Rogers could not prevent the use of her name in the title of the fictional film.125
The Rogers test is the leading and most appropriate test in cases in which
the court must balance First Amendment interests with protections of parties’
rights under the Lanham Act. While courts continue to apply the Rogers test to
the use of trademarks in the titles of artistic or expressive works,126 courts have
since extended the test to the uses of trademarks in the actual content of artistic
works.127 However, most courts have rejected this test for right-of-publicity
cases because it includes a falsity element,128 which is not a requirement under
right-of-publicity laws,129 and because it lacks any evaluative criteria.130
For the same reasons, it is an unavailing test for right-of-publicity cases
concerning a persona tattoo. If the celebrity’s tattoo is identifiable as indicia of
the tattoo bearer and a third party commercially uses the celebrity’s tattoo, then
the relationship of the tattoo to the work in which it appears is irrelevant. If relevance was a factor in the balancing of the First Amendment and right-of124

Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
Id. at 1005.
126
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003). In Parks, the Sixth Circuit
held that hip-hop musical group OutKast’s use of Rosa Parks’ name in the title of a song was
“trademark use” and defendant’s use of the mark could cause consumers to falsely believe
that Rosa Parks was affiliated with or approved of the song. Id. at 448–49. The court applied
the Rogers test in this case. It identified the critical issue as “a determination of the artistic
relevance of the title, Rosa Parks, to the content of the song,” which required an analysis of
the song’s lyrics “in their entirety.” Id. at 442. According to the court, apart from the line
“move to the back of the bus” repeated throughout, the song otherwise was not intended to
be and was not about Rosa Parks, thus reasonable persons could find no connection between
the use of Rosa Parks’s name in the title and the song itself. Id. at 452–53. The court chose
the Rogers test, over “likelihood of confusion” test, the traditional test for trademark cases,
and the “alternative avenues” test, as the proper approach for balancing First Amendment
interests with the false advertising claim under the Lanham Act because the other two approaches did not give “adequate weight to the First Amendment interests in the case.” Id. at
448–49. The court then applies the Rogers test to Parks’s right-of-publicity claim as well,
without any independent analysis of or reasoning for the application of the test to the publicity claim, and supplements the use of the Rogers test with support from the Restatement’s
relatedness test. See id. at 461.
127
E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Although this test traditionally applies to uses of a trademark in the title of an artistic work,
there is no principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use of a trademark in the
body of the work.”); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Rogers test is “generally applicable to Lanham Act
claims against works of artistic expression”).
128
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:53.
129
Parks, 329 F.3d at 460 (“[A] right of publicity claim does differ from a false advertising
claim in one crucial respect; a right of publicity claim does not require any evidence that a
consumer is likely to be confused.”).
130
Lee, supra note 37, at 485.
125
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publicity interests, then allowing commercial use of a celebrity’s identity because it happens to be relevant would undermine a celebrity’s (and a court’s)
ability to protect against the exploitation of the very subject matter that the
right of publicity was created to preserve.131 In addition, whether the public is
misled or confused as to the source or content of the work, while critical to a
Lanham Act claim, is unimportant to the analysis of a right-of-publicity
claim.132
C.   The Relatedness Test
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition prescribes the Relatedness
test, which protects the use of one’s identity in an expressive work unless the
“name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related
to the identified person.”133 This test is representative of the breadth of the
scope of First Amendment protection set forth in the Restatement. For example,
the Restatement first states that “[t]he use of a person’s identity primarily for
the purpose of communicating information or expressing ideas is not generally
actionable as a violation of the person’s right of publicity.”134 It then lists a
multitude of uses of a person’s identity that would not “generally” infringe the
right of publicity: (1) news reporting, whether in newspapers, magazines, or
broadcast news; (2) entertainment and other creative works, such as novels,
plays, or motion pictures, both fiction and nonfiction; and (3) articles published
in fan magazines or in feature story broadcasts on an entertainment program.135
Such overgeneralizations are not helpful in an analysis where the use of a work
is both expressive and commercial.136 The Restatement’s broad sweep of protected activities does not amount to much of a test and swings the pendulum too
far away from right-of-publicity interests. Further, the singular criteria of “relatedness” would potentially favor exploitative uses of a persona tattoo if the
third-party user even tangentially relates the work to the celebrity.

131

Gervais & Holmes, supra note 67, at 213 (“The Rogers test seems to protect First
Amendment principles at the expense of the natural rights an individual possesses in her
identity.”).
132
Id. at 199–200 (“Rationales that are used to justify trademark law should not be offered
to justify the right of publicity simply because the two rights seem similar. . . . ‘[S]ome
courts have failed to see the important distinctions and have unthinkingly imported certain
inapplicable pieces of trademark doctrine into right of publicity cases . . . .’ ” (quoting Hart v.
Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2013))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“Proof of deception or consumer confusion
is not required for the imposition of liability under this Section.”).
133
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
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The Relatedness test has been referred to as a version of, or another name
for, the Rogers test.137 However, courts typically have used the Relatedness test
as support for the Rogers test or other balancing approaches instead of employing it as an independent test for balancing First Amendment and trademark interests.138 The Relatedness test is not the equivalent of the Rogers test. Indeed,
the sole criterion—whether the use is solely to attract attention to a work unrelated to the person—embodies the first prong of the Rogers test: relevance. The
second prong—an examination of whether the relevant use is nevertheless an
explicitly misleading use—is not present in the Restatement’s Relatedness test.
The Relatedness test alone is not the proper test for the balancing of First
Amendment interests and right-of-publicity claims. It does not amount to much
of a test; it protects “related” uses and lists broad categories of protected subject matter. Furthermore, the Relatedness test—whether applied as a duplicate
or version of the Rogers test—is an inappropriate test for balancing the aforementioned competing interests for the same reasons that the Rogers test is illsuited to do so.
D.   Predominant Use Test
The Supreme Court of Missouri was the first to recognize and employ the
“predominate use” test, adopted from the following proposed approach set forth
137

Thomas E. Kadri, Comment, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity
Goes 2–0 Against Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2014) (“Sometimes called the Rogers test, sometimes the Restatement test, it usually appears in the context
of trademark law.”). Kadri recommends the Rogers test over the Transformative Use test
because it is a “bright-line test.” Id. However, Kadri’s recharacterization of the Rogers test
for right-of-publicity claims mistakenly assumes that the speech at issue (or more appropriately, the use at issue) can be classified as “purely commercial” or expressive. Id. The refined Rogers test would be applied to expressive, or speech that is not purely commercial,
but the test would still require inquiries regarding whether the use is “ ‘wholly unrelated’ to
the content of the work or is ‘simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of
goods or services.’ ” Id. The pitfalls of this test’s application to right-of-publicity claims are
the same as the current Rogers test. First, it requires judges to critique the artistry of the
work in order to determine the relevance of the use to the work. Second, even if the use is
relevant to the work, it continues to require a misleading element. The first prong raises the
same concerns of subjectivity and unreliability as the Transformative Use test. The second
prong, while appropriate for balancing First Amendment interests with Lanham Act claims,
which protect against likelihood of confusion and false, misleading uses, is ill-suited to balance free speech interests with right-of-publicity claims.
138
Parks v. Laface Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the Rogers test is
supported “in the context of other expressive works by comment c of § 47 of the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition”); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that it “look to” Ohio state law and the Third Restatement of Unfair
Competition to determine whether Tiger Woods has a right-of-publicity claim but adopts the
Transformative Use test as its balancing approach). But see, Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964
F. Supp. 918, 930 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the use of Seale’s likeness on the inside of a
musical CD soundtrack was protected by the First Amendment under the Restatement’s Relatedness test).
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in Mark S. Lee’s article, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the
Right of Publicity—Free Speech Interface:139
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an
individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity
and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some “expressive”
content in it that might qualify as “speech” in other circumstances. If, on the
other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an expressive
comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater
weight.140

In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, the court found that the use of the name and
identity of professional hockey player Anthony “Tony” Twist for a character
named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli in the Spawn comic book series was
“predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related products rather than an
artistic or literary expression.”141 In this case, the court rejected other balancing
tests because of their failure to properly accommodate right-of-publicity interests.142 After applying the Predominant Use test, the court concluded that the
right-of-publicity interests outweighed First Amendment interests.143 The court
appropriately focused on the use of the celebrity’s name and likeness in the
comic book, not the comic book itself.144
139

Lee, supra note 37, at 500.
Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 374 (quoting Lee, supra note 37, at 500), aff’d, Doe v. McFarlane,
207 S.W. 3d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming jury award for damages for use of name
and identity of professional hockey player Anthony “Tony” Twist as comic book character
Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli).
141
Id.
142
Id.
140

The weakness of the Restatement’s ‘relatedness’ test and California’s ‘transformative’ test is
that they give too little consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity
have both expressive and commercial components. These tests operate to preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the name and identity is in any way expressive, regardless of its commercial exploitation. Under the relatedness test, use of a person’s name and identity is actionable
only when the use is solely commercial and is otherwise unrelated to that person. Under the
transformative test, the transformation or fictionalized characterization of a person’s celebrity
status is not actionable even if its sole purpose is the commercial use of that person’s name and
identity. Though these tests purport to balance the prospective interests involved, there is no balancing at all—once the use is determined to be expressive, it is protected.

Id.
143

Id.
Id. While there has been criticism of the application of the Predominant Use test in this
particular instance (and the court’s decision as a result of the application of the test), this Article does not agree with the basis of that criticism. See Tushnet, supra note 108, at 167
(“Remarkably, the court found that the entire comic book Spawn was predominantly an exploitation of Tony Twist (the hockey player), even though Tony Twist (the character) was a
minor character in a story about an undead superhero who had been released from Hell.”).
Professor Rebecca Tushnet observes that the entire book was at issue and the Tony Twist
character was a minor character in the Spawn story. Id. Yet, she goes on to assume that the
Missouri Supreme Court was solely persuaded by the promotion of the comic book at hockey events. Id. at 167, n.53.
144
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Twist made a submissible case that respondents’ use of his name and identity
was for a commercial advantage. Nonetheless, there is still an expressive component in the use of his name and identity as a metaphorical reference to toughguy “enforcers.” And yet, respondents agree (perhaps to avoid a defamation
claim) that the use was not a parody or other expressive comment or a fictionalized account of the real Twist. As such, the metaphorical reference to Twist,
though a literary device, has very little literary value compared to its commercial
value.145

Ultimately, the court concluded that the predominant purpose for the use of
the Tony Twist name was to sell comic books and promotional products, not
make an expressive comment about the hockey player. Therefore, the use was
not entitled to First Amendment protection.146 The court did not hold that the
comic book itself, which consisted of expression other than the Twist character,
was not entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. The court was presented with evidence of commercial use of Twist’s identity beyond the promotion of the comic book at hockey events: (1) Tony Twist, the hockey player,
submitted evidence suggesting that the defendants marketed their hockey products, which included images of the Tony Twist character, to hockey fans and
(2) defendants sponsored a “Spawn Night” at a hockey event, where defendant
Todd McFarlane personally distributed such products. Finally, and probably
most important, plaintiff submitted evidence of actual diminution of his commercial value as an endorser of products—a former executive of a sports nutrition company “testified that his company withdrew a $100,000 offer to Twist to
serve as the company’s product endorser after [he] learned that Twist’s name
was associated with the evil Mafia don in the Spawn comic book.”147 While the
Tony Twist character may have been a minor part of the comic book, the character was prominently featured in the promotion of the book and merchandise.
Further, the promotion and sale of the products, which ultimately and purposefully drew greater attention to the Twist character in the comic book, negatively
affected the economic value of Tony Twist the hockey player. Damage is presumed from unauthorized use,148 but this is an instance in which the plaintiff
actually had evidence of damage.149 The prevention of damage to the economic
value of a celebrity’s image is the very purpose of right-of-publicity laws.
Thus, the primary or predominant purpose of the comic book’s use of the Twist
character was a commercial use. This Article asserts that the court did not err in
upholding the damages award for the comic book itself.150

145

Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 374.
Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W. 3d 52, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
147
Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 367.
148
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:2.
149
Id. However, “[i]f plaintiff seeks the recovery of damages, then commercial damage must
be proved and quantified.” Id.
150
Doe, 207 S.W. 3d at 76.
146
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Even though Lee’s conception of the test focuses on whether there should
be First Amendment protection of the “product,”151 here an expressive work,
the Missouri Supreme Court appropriately narrowed its focus to the protection
of the use within the product. This Article agrees with the application, particularly when the “product” is an expressive work. If the test is applied in this
way, it is the most appropriate test for the accommodation of free speech and
right-of-publicity interests. Unlike the Transformative Use test, it is clear that
the relevant expressiveness to be analyzed under the Predominant Use test is
the use, not the work itself. An examination of the context of the use in the balancing of First Amendment and right-of-publicity interests invites the subjective, unpredictable critique of the work itself, as evidenced in the multi-step
process of the Transformative Use test.
In addition, the Predominant Use test properly inquires into the mixed expressive and commercial uses of a person’s identity, rather than placing undue
focus on the expressive context of the use. It is clear that the test is intended to
address the complexities of the use of a celebrity’s identity in modern media
and prevent the First Amendment’s trampling of the right of publicity.
The Predominant Use test has been criticized because the approach is
“primarily concerned with . . . whether the use was commercial” and implicitly
concludes “that at least some expressive speech has no First Amendment value.”152 To the contrary, this test properly recognizes that there are often both
expressive and commercial uses of an identity. The originator of this approach
stated that the proper inquiry is the subject of the exploitation—the commercial
value of the celebrity’s identity or expressive commentary on or about the celebrity.153
The Doe court’s application of the Predominant Use test is the appropriate
test for balancing First Amendment and right-of-publicity interests, including
persona tattoo publicity cases. The case refines the Predominate Use test—
viewing the use of indicia of the celebrity’s identity (e.g., the tattoo in this case)
in an expressive work as the potential violation of the right of publicity, not the
work itself. This refinement best addresses the challenges of assessing mixed
commercial and expressive uses of a celebrity’s identity and preserves a true
accommodation of the competing interests. If the predominant use of the tattoo
is a commercial one, an exploitation of the associative value of the celebrity’s
identity, then the right of publicity should protect against such use. However, if
151

Lee confirmed that the term “product” set forth in the proposed balancing test set forth in
his article, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity—Free
Speech Interface, refers to “the entirety of the work in which someone’s right of publicity
was used.” E-mail from Mark S. Lee, Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, to Yolanda M.
King, Assoc. Professor of Law, N. Ill. Univ. Coll. of Law (Mar. 9, 2015, 11:04) (on file with
author).
152
Smith, supra note 32, at 2091–92.
153
Lee, supra note 37, at 500–01.
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the predominant use of the tattoo is for an expressive purpose, then the First
Amendment should prevail.
CONCLUSION
If a celebrity’s tattoo becomes indicia of that celebrity’s identity, then the
tattoo is now a part of the protectable right of publicity of that celebrity. Thus, a
tattoo is a rare instance of a publicity right born from a copyrightable work. A
celebrity tattoo bearer should be able to bring a right-of-publicity claim based
on the commercial use of his or her tattoo by a third party. The prevalence of
tattooing among celebrities, coupled with the growing interest in the commercialization of tattoos, increases the likelihood of this type of right-of-publicity
lawsuit in the future. Courts should employ the Predominant Use test in order
to properly accommodate the mixed commercial and expressive uses of a celebrity’s tattoo and prevent the First Amendment’s eclipsing of the right of publicity.

